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Abstract
We consider a general equilibrium model a la Bhaskar (Review of Economic
Studies 2002): there are complementarities across sectors, each of which com-
prise (many) heterogenous monopolistically competitive rms. Bhaskars model
is extended in two directions: production requires capital, and labour markets
are segmented. Labour market segmentation models the di¢ culties of labour
migrating across international barriers (in a trade context) or from a poor region
to a richer one (in a regional context), whilst the assumption of a single cap-
ital market means that capital ows freely between countries or regions. The
model is solved analytically and a closed form solution is provided. Adding
labour market segmentation to Bhaskars two-tier industrial structure allows
us to study, inter alia, the impact of competition regulations on wages and -
nancial ows both in the regional and international context, and the output,
welfare and nancial implications of relaxing immigration laws. The analytical
approach adopted allows us, not only to sign the e¤ect of policies, but also to
quantify their e¤ects. Introducing capital as a factor of production improves
the realism of the model and renes its empirically testable implications.
JEL Classication Nos : F22, L11, F16, R13
Keywords : market segmentation, monopolistic competition, industry com-
petition, regional competition, capital ows
1. INTRODUCTION
Our work mainly focus on two points, both relevant in current economic
studies: demand elasticity heterogeneity across sectors and labour market seg-
mentation.
In the market, we generally nd goods that are subject to di¤erent degrees
of substitutability. This may be due to several reasons: the number of rms
operating in an industry, the elasticity of substitution in consumption between
products, the information level on the goods, and market regulations in each
sector. Demand elasticity and then markup heterogeneity has been studied
by F.Bilbiie,F. Ghironi and M. Melitz (2006), that prove that e¢ ciency re-
quires markups to be synchronized across goods, and resources are ine¢ ciently
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underallocated on the production of the good with higher mark-ups (that is
consumption) respect to leisure, for which mark-up is absent. 2
Furthermore, our model includes labour market segmentation at the indus-
try/region level. This is to study the di¢ culties of labour migrating across
international barriers (in a trade context) or from a poor region to a richer one
(in a regional context). Focusing the attention on the mobility of labour gives
us the possibility to address relevant issues about migration policies and to un-
derstand who gains and who looses by allowing labour to freely move across
boarders and, so doing, leading to homogenization of wages. As an example,
we might think of the enlargement of the European Union to Turkey and/or
to other Eastern Europe countries, that is currently challenging economists and
politicians about opportunities and costs. At a national level ,instead, we might
think of policies able to lead to an e¢ cient distribution of labour across either
regions or industrial sectors.
Our set up is an extension of the general equilibrium framework by Bhaskar
(Review of Economic Studies, 2002), that introduces the distinction between
producer and industry. That structure has been chosen as industrial sectors and
regional areas are thought of as being complementary to each other through spe-
cialization3 .There are two input factors : capital and labour. We start assuming
capital as free mobile, whilst labour is segmented at the industry level and not
allowed to move across industries. Then, we relax limitations for labour to move
and assume labour to be free mobile, such as capital. Comparing the results
from the two settings allows us to calculate whether and to which extent labour
integration leads to welfare gains or losses, both at the global economy level and
at the industry/region level. Problems related to economic integration have al-
ready been addressed, by focusing on distributive implications (see H.Cremer,
P. Pestiau, 1996; A.S. Kessler, C. Lulfesmann, G.M. Myers, 2002). Instead, we
mostly study integration by looking at the results in terms of e¢ ciency.
By setting a multi-industry (multi-regional) production economy, we prove
that if within industry demand elasticities are equal, then full integrated models
input factors distribution exactly matches the social planner solution; otherwise,
particular exogenous distributions of that input resource can correct the distor-
tion due to mark-up heterogeneity across industries and give a larger global
production. Moreover, our analysis is made analytically more realistic by tak-
ing into account rm level productivity heterogeneity. Thus, allocation of input
factors is led by both relative productivities of rms/industries and the industry
level mark-up degrees.
Finally, our setting is able to contribute to some of the major trade literature
over the last years (see M. Melitz, 2003; M.Melitz, G.Ottaviano, 2008, J. Eaton,
2P. Epifani and G. Gancia (2008) have studied this problem in a multi-sector economy:
they rst provide empirical evidence of the intersectoral mark-up asymmetry in the U.S. and
then prove that the latter, due to trade or other distortions, leads to intersectoral misalloca-
tions.Their starting point is that "if the degree of monopoly is the same for all nal products,
there is no monopolistic competition alteration from the optimum at all" (Lerner, 1934).
3 In a trade context, complementarity of sectors follows the Armington assumption : the
more substitutable goods from di¤erent sectors, the more di¤erences between them can a¤ect
trade.
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S. Kortum, 2002), by taking into account three types of asymmetries altogether:
productivity (at the rm level), labour endowement (that is the labour amount
available at the industry/region level in a segmented economy) and demand
elasticity (at the industry/region level). Each one of those heterogeneities can
crucially a¤ect the competitiveness in a trade context: industries/regions with
a larger demand elasticity, a larger aggregate technical e¢ ciency and a larger
labour endowment are likely to be more competitive through lower production
costs and, then, prices.
The structure of the paper follows : section 2 outlines the preferences and
the technology assumed in the model; section 3 provides the equilibrium in an
economy in which capital is allowed to be free mobile across industries, whilst
labour is segmented at the industry level; section 4 shows another version of the
model, in which both capital and labour are assumed to be free mobile; section
5 shows the social planner solution; section 6 illustrates the e¤ects of labour
market liberalization in a two-country economy; section 7 concludes the paper
by summarizing the main results.
2. OUTLINE OF THE MODEL
The model extends the framework implemented by Bhaskar (2002, RES),
by adding capital as a production factor and segmenting the labour market at
the industry level. Furthermore, we allow for demand elasticity heterogeneity
across industries (regions).
We present a pure production economy. There is one good produced at the
global level by a standard CES production function. The latter has as arguments
industry/region level products coming from standard CES production functions
as well. Intermediate inputs are produced by heterogenous monopolistically
competitive rms having to hire both the input factors, that means labour and
capital. A large number of rms operate in each region/industry and the number
of varieties within each sector is allowed to di¤er.
We set two di¤erent economies4 : in the rst one, labour is segmented at
the industry/region level; in the second one, labour is allowed to be free mobile
such as capital is in both the settings. The two modelsequilibria turn out to be
crucially di¤erent in terms of production, intermediate inputs costs,and factors
allocation. In particular, in the rst framework wages di¤er across industries,
whilst in the fully integrated economy equilibrium wage is unique such as the
rental in both the settings.
There is one representative agent, which inelastically supplies an exogenously
xed amount of capitalK through all the economy and a xed amount of labour,
that is Ls to the single industries in the rst setting, and L through all the
economy in the second one.
4We have also derived one more setting in which both capital and labour are segmented at
the sector level. We can provide that on request.
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Preferences and technology
2.1 Global and industry sector
The global sector, operating under perfect competition, uses the goods pro-
duced at the industry/region level to produce the nal good according to the
standard CES aggregation function,
Y =
"
1
S1 
SX
s=1
Y s
# 1

;  2 (0; 1) ; (1)
where Y is the aggregate output of the global sector. The latter will make
zero prot, as well as the industry/region sector, since the production function
shows constant returns to scale in the inputs Ys , and since this sector is per-
fectly competitive, . The elasticity of substitution between any two products is
1/(   1) : The global sector generates a derived demand for the di¤erentiated
products produced by industries, which will be shown next.
The industry/region sector also produces according a standard CES aggre-
gation function using the specialized inputs:
Ys =
"
1
N
1 s
s
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n=1
qsn;s
# 1
s
; s 2 (0; 1) ; (2)
where Ys is the aggregate output of the industry. Even in this case, since
the production function shows constant returns and this sector is perfectly com-
petitive, the prot made will be zero. The elasticity of substitution between any
two products is 1/(s   1), and it is allowed to vary. The industry/region sector
creates a derived demand for the di¤erentiated products, which will be shown
next.
2.2 Derived demand
Cost minimization of (1) generates the derived demand for the industry/region
level good Ys as a function of its own price eps; of the price of the nal good p
and of the total output of the nal good Y
Ys 

peps
 1
1  Y
S
; with
1
p
 1
S
SX
s=1
1eps ; (3)
with   = (1  ) 2 R+:
Cost minimization of (2) generates the derived demand for the specialized
input qn;s as a function of its own price epn;s; of the price of the region level
good eps and of the total output of the regional good Ys;
4
qn;s 
 epsepn;s
 1
1 s Ys
Ns
; with
1epss  1Ns
NsX
n=1
1epsn;s ; (4)
with s  s= (1  s) 2 R+:
Putting the derived demand for the industry good (3) into the latter yields
qn;s 
 epsepn;s
 1
1 s

peps
 1
1  Y
SNs
:
2.3 Specialized rms
In each industry/region, there is a xed large number N5s of monopolistically
competitive rms, each one producing a di¤erentiate product. Firm ns produces
according to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function which takes capital
and labour as inputs
qn;s = n;sk

n;sl
1 
n;s ;  2 (0; 1) ; (5)
where qn;s is its output, n;s is its technical e¢ ciency and kn;s, ln;s are the
inputs of, respectively, capital and
labour used up by the rm.
3. LABOUR SEGMENTED ECONOMY
3.1 Welfare
In each industry/region, the welfare function is given by summing up rmsprots,
labour and capital incomes:
Is =
NsX
n=1
en;s +ei bKs + ewsLs; (6)
where bKs is the amount of capital assumed to be owned by sector s. At the
global level, the welfare is given by adding up the industry/region level welfares.
3.2 Producer optimization
The monopoly rms have to hire physical capital and labour on competitive
labour markets, because they do not own any input factor. The nominal prot
of rm ns is
en;s  epn;sqn;s   eikn;s + ewsln;s ;
where epn;s is the nominal price of the product, ews is the nominal wage rate
in sector s, and ei is the nominal rental. Notice that, as the labour market is
5The number of rms is allowed to vary across sectors.
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segmented, nominal wages turn out to be di¤erent across industries/regions.
The interest rate, instead, is the same over all sectors, as capital is assumed to
be free mobile.
The rm n,s faces the demand curve shown before (??) and seeks to maximize
its prot
max
kn;s;ln;s
epn;sqn;s   eikn;s + ewsln;s ; subject to n;skn;sl1 n;s = qn;s. (7)
Each monopolistically competitive rm faces the minimization problem in
(7), in order to derive the minimal unit cost. The result is that each agent within
the same industry/region will choose to operate with the same capital/labour
ratio s
kn;s
ln;s
=

1  
ws
i
= s; (8)
The derived demand for labour and capital by the rm n,s producing qn;s is
kn;s =
1 s qn;s
n;s
and ln;s =
qn;s
n;s

s
; (9)
Capital K is exogenously given at the global level. In order to make both
the labour and the capital markets clear, the following must hold
K =
SX
s=1
sLs: (10)
3.3 Optimal prices
As a monopolist, the intermediate input rm seeks to maximize its prot by
charging a price epn;s that is equal to a xed mark-up (1/s) over cost. Using the
optimal capital/labour ratio (8) and the derived demand for capital and labour
(9) yields the price charged by rm n,s
epn ;s = ws
(1  ) ssn;s
p: (11)
The industry/region level aggregate productivity is given by
ss =
1
Ns
NsX
n=1
sn;s: (12)
Using the latter and the sector level price aggregation (4) yields that within
a sector s, the rm relative price is inversely proportional to the rm relative
productivity.
epn ;seps = sn;s : (13)
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Using the latter, the global sector production function (1), the derived de-
mand for specialized inputs (4), the optimal capital-labour ratio (8), the input
market clearing condition (10),the optimal price charged by rm n,s (11), and
the assumption that labour is inelastically supplied at the region level, we nd
that
eps
p
=

1
S
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s=1
L
(1 )
1 
s 

1 
s 

1 
s
 1

L
(1 )(1 )
1 
s 
(1 )
1 
s 
(1 )
1 
s
: (14)
Thus, the industry level relative price turns out to be an decreasing function
of the labour inelastically supplied in that sector, the aggregate productivity
and the within industry demand elasticity.
Rearranging the optimal price ratio at the sector level (11) for the real wage
and substituting the result into the optimal capital-labour ratio (8), and then
what we nd into the input market clearing equation (10), and recalling (14),
we can derive the real rental rate, that turns out to be a decreasing function of
the capital stock :
i =


1
S
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s=1
L
(1 )
1 
s 

1 
s 
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1 
s
 1
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PS
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1 
s 

1 
s
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(1 )
1 
s
1 
K1 
: (15)
Using the latter, the optimal capital/labour ratio (8) and the sector relative
price (14) gives the real wage rate
ws =
(1  ) K

1
S
PS
s=1
L
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
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PS
s=1 
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
1 
s
L
(1 )
1 
s
 : (16)
Industry/region level wage results to be an increasing function of the within
industry demand elasticity and aggregate productivities6 . Thus, relatively more
competitive industries are expected to show higher real wages.
3.4 Factor allocation and nal output
Substituting the price ratios (13) and (14) into the derived demand for spe-
cialized input (4), and using the latter to replace qn;s into the rmsdemand for
labour (9),and aggregating labour demand over all monopoly rm by recalling
that labour is inelastically supplied at the sector level,Ls; we can derive the
global production
Ls =
NsX
n=1
ln;s () Y=SLsss
 eps
p
 1
1 
: (17)
6We have shown that by numerical exemples, that are available upon request.
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Considering the optimal capital/labour ratio (8),the equations for real rental
rate and the real wage rate (15 and 16),the relative price at the global level (14),
the nal good production is
Y =
K
PS
s=1
L
(1 )
1 
s 

1 
s 

1 
s
 1

S
1 

"PS
s=1
L
(1 )
1 
s 
1
1 
s 

1 
s
# : (18)
From the latter and the relative prices (13 and 14), we can derive the pro-
duction at the rm level
qn;s =

1
1 s
n;s
L
1 
1 
s 
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)(1 s)
s
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
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)
1 
s

Ns
: (19)
Substituting the rm level production (19) ,the optimal capital-labour ratio
(8), along with the real rental rate and the real wage rate (15 and 16), into the
derived demand for labour and capital (9), we nd the optimal factor allocation
kn;s =

s
1 s
n;s
L
(1 )
1 
s 
s( 1)+ s
(1 )(1 s)
s
K
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1 
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s=1 
1
1 
s 
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1 
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L
(1 )
1 
s

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; (20)
ln;s =
Ls
s
1 s
n;s
Ns
s
1 s
s
: (21)
At the rm level, capital allocation turns out to be a function of all the pa-
rameters ruling this economy. Instead, labour is allocated according the average
size and relative productivity of the rm within the sector7 .
Particularly, labour distribution is a¤ected only by the parameters at the
sector level: this result exactly matches what we would nd in a one sector
industry8 .
4. INTEGRATED ECONOMY
4.1 Welfare
At the industry/region level, the welfare function is given by summing up
rmsprot, labour and capital income
Is
9 =
NsX
n=1
en;s + ei bKs + ewLs; (22)
7We can show that in an economy in which both capital and labour are segmented at the
sector level, the two input factors are distributed as labour in (21), that means they both turn
out to be functions of the rms relative productivity and its average size.
8See Abadir and Talmain (RES, 2002).
9We use asterisk * to indicate the variables from the labour integrated model, and di¤er-
entiate them from the ones coming from the rst setting.
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where bKs is the capital owned by sector s. At the global level, the welfare
is given by adding up the region level welfares.
4.2 Producer optimization
The monopoly rms have to hire physical and labour on competitive labour
markets, because they do not own any capital. The nominal prot of rm n,s is
en;s  epn;sqn;s   eikn;s + ewln;s ;
where epn;s is the nominal price of the product, ew is the nominal wage rate,
and ei is the nominal rental. As both the labour and the capital market are fully
integrated, the wage rate and the rental rate are unique over all the economy.
The rm faces a demand curve that we will derive next and seek to maximize
its prot
max
kn;s;ln;s
epn;sqn;s   eikn;s + ewln;s ; subject to n;skn;sl1 n;s = qn;s: (23)
Each monopolistically competitive rm faces the minimization problem in
(23), in order to derive the minimal unit cost. The result is that each agent over
all the economy will choose to operate with the same capital/labour ratio  :
kn;s
ln;s
=

1  
w
i
= : (24)
The derived demand for labour and capital by the rm n,s producing qn;s is
kn;s =
1 qn;s
n;s
; ln;s =
qn;s
n;s
: (25)
4.3 Optimal prices
As a monopolist, the intermediate input rm seeks to maximize its prot by
charging a price epn;s that is equal to a xed mark-up (1/s) over cost. Using
the optimal capital/labour ratio (24) and the derived demand for capital and
labour (25) yields the price charged by rm n,s
epn ;s = w(1  ) sn;s p: (26)
Using the sector level price aggregation (4) and the sector level productivity
aggregation (12) yields that within a sector the relative price inversely propor-
tional to the relative productivity:
epn ;seps = sn;s : (27)
Aggregating (26) at the sector level and using (12) yields:
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eps = w(1  ) ss p:
First aggregating the latter at the sector level, and then dividing that by the
result gives
ps
p
=
 
1
S
 1

hPS
s=1 (ss)

i 1

ss
: (28)
In this case, the sector relative price turns out to be an increasing function
of industry level aggregate productivity and demand elasticity10 .
Using the labour and capital demand (25), the derived demand for special-
ized good (4), the sector level productivity aggregation (12) and the assumption
that both capital and labour are inelastically supplied at the global level, we
derive that the optimal capital/labour ratio is simply equal to the ratio between
the exogenous global capital stock (K) and the exogenous global labour stock
(L). From the latter and the equation of the price charged by rms (26), it
turns out that the real rental rate and the real wage rate are respectively
i = 

L
K
1  "
1
S
SX
s=1
(ss)

# 1

; (29)
w = (1  )

K
L
 "
1
S
SX
s=1
(ss)

# 1

: (30)
Both the real wage and the real interest rate are functions of the aggregate
capital and the aggregate labour; moreover, they result to be increasing func-
tions of an aggregation of industry level aggregate productivities and demand
elasticities.
4.4 Factor allocation and nal output
Substituting the price ratios (27 and 28) into the derived demand for spe-
cialized input (4), and putting the result along with the optimal capital-labour
ratio (K=L) into one of the input aggregations yields the nal good production
Y  =
S
 1
 K

L
1 
PS
s=1 

(1 )
s 

1 
s
 1

PS
s=1 

1 
s 
1
1 
s
: (31)
Using the latter and the relative prices (27 and 28), we can derive the rm
n,sproduction
10See note 6.
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n;s K

L
1 
Ns
PS
s=1 
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1 
s 
1
1 
s
 : (32)
The distribution of production at the rm level is led by the industry/region
level aggregate productivity and demand elasticity and, moreover, by rms
productivity.
Finally, substituting the rm level production and the optimal capital/
labour ratio into the derived demand for labour and capital (25) yields the
factor allocation in the integrated economy
kn;s=

s
1 s
n;s 
1
1 
s 
 s
(1 )(1 s)
s K
Ns
PS
s=1 

1 
s 
1
1 
s
; (33)
ln;s=

s
1 s
n;s 
1
1 
s 
 s
(1 )(1 s)
s L
Ns
PS
s=1 

1 
s 
1
1 
s
: (34)
Both capital and labour allocations turn out to be a function of all the para-
meters of this economy. Therefore, labour is allocated in a crucially di¤erent way
respect to the segmented economy; particularly, it is also an increasing function
of the within sector demand elasticity: as long as rms operating in di¤erent
sectors have di¤erent mark-ups, they distort labour allocation asymmetrically.
5. SOCIAL PLANNER SOLUTION
The social planner optimizes the distribution of input factors over the econ-
omy. Assuming both capital and labour to be inelastically supplied at the global
level, she faces the following optimization problem :
max
ffkn;s;ln;sgNsn=1gSs=1
Y =
24 1
S1 
SX
s=1
 
1
N
1 s
s
NsX
n
 
n;sk

n;sl
1 
n;s
s! s 35
1

:
Capital and labour turn out to be distributed at the rm level as follows:
kn;s =
K
 s
(1 s)(1 )
s 
s
1 s
n;s
SNs

1 
; (35)
ln;s =
L
 s
(1 s)(1 )
s 
s
1 s
n;s
SNs

1 
:
The model with full integration of input factors matches what found by
the social planner if within sector demand elasticities are equal. If intrasector
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mark-ups di¤er, there is going to be distortion in the allocation of inputs, that
is overallocation in industries/regions with higher demand elasticity and, on the
contrary, underallocation where mark-ups are higher.
Furthermore, distribution of production factors according to the model in
which labour is assumed to be segmented at the sector level also matches (35),
if within sector demand elasticities are the same and, moreover, labour supplied
at the sector level is equal to
Ls =
L
S

s

 
1 
11 :
6. A TWO-COUNTRY ECONOMY
Thinking of what we have called so far industries or regions as countries
gives us the opportunity to study what would happen in a two-country model
in case of labour market integration. In this economy, capital is assumed to be
free mobile, while labour force is initially assumed to be contrained at original
population level (N1 and N2), and then , in a second stage, it is allowed to freely
move across boarders by migration.
FIGURE 1
11The right-hand side of that equation results by aggregating the labour demand given by
(35) at the sector level.
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We distinguish between two di¤erent scenarios: in the rst one, countries
face the same within-boarder demand elasticity and di¤er only by size (that
is population); in the second case, instead, one country has a larger demand
elasticity than the other one.
We graphically show the welfare level at both the global and the country
level for di¤erent distribution of the global population across the two countries.
In each country, population can be lower, equal or larger than the allocation
of labour according to the integrated labour setting. The number of producers
is assumed to be the same, such as rm level productivities. Depending on
the starting population "status", countries are going to face immigration (if the
population is lower the labour allocation dictated by the integrated setting) or
emigration (if the population is larger than the amount of labour expected after
liberalization of the labour market).
The distribution of the workforce across the two countries is going to a¤ect
the three components of the welfare, that means labour income, capital income
and prots. Capital ownership is assumed to be equally shared by the two coun-
tries12 ; however, capital income changes according to the workforce distribution
that a¤ects the interest rate equilibrium. In the segmented economy wages di¤er
across countries: the larger the population, the lower the wage in the respective
country is. Thus, labour income for the two countries is going to be a¤ected by
labour market liberalization through both labour moves and changes in wages
(that becomes higher in the country facing emigration and lower in that fac-
ing immigration).13 Production distribution across rms operating in the two
countries results to be a¤ected by changes in the labour allocation ; changes in
the labour and capital distribution and then, input factor costs, are going to
a¤ect rmsprots.
6.1 First scenario: mark-up homogeneity
As shown in Figure 214 , a labour segmented economy as a whole can never
perform better than a fully integrated one, whatever the distribution of popu-
lation across the two countries is. The two economies reach the same outcome
as the population distribution is equal to the labour force distribution dictated
by the labour integrated economy.
Figure 3 shows that the less populated country can be either better or worse
o¤ in an integrated economy, depending on the distribution of population. Par-
ticularly, that country has larger prots and capital income in an integrated
economy, but lower labour income, that is due to a lower number of workers.
As the population becomes more and more similar to the one of the other coun-
try, the gains in terms of prots and capital income are not able to o¤set the
12We can also show what happens in case of di¤erent distribution of the capital ownership
across the two countries. However, at the moment we prefer focusing on labour market
asymmetries.
13Notice that if people cross the boarder, they are still sending what thet earn abroad to
their original country by remittences.
14Figures are provided in the appendix at the end of the paper.
13
labour income loss in an integrated context anymore ,as the wage becomes lower
and lower, so that the overall economy results to be worse o¤.
On the other hand,as shown in Figure 4, the more populated country turns
out to be always better o¤ as it moves out of the segmented economy. Never-
theless, as the population gets closer and closer to the one of the other country,
the positive gap between the integrated economy income and the segmented
economy one becomes lower and lower; the latter is because the gain in terms
of labour income becomes thinner and thinner as the population decreases.
6.2 Second scenario:mark-up heterogeneity
Figure 5 shows that for some distributions of population across the two
countries, the segmented economy can perform better than the integrated one.
Of course, the incomes of the two economies are equal at the point in which
the population distribution exactly matches the distribution of the labour force
according to free mobile labour setting. The ine¢ ciency implied by integration
for some distributions of the populations is due to the cross country mark-
up heterogeneity, that leads to asymmetric distortion of factor allocation and,
particularly, to overallocation of labour in the more competitive economy. This
ine¢ ciency seems to be corrected as labour is segmented at the country level.
Figure 6 shows that in an integrated economy the higher demand elasticity
country is worse o¤ as long as the population is lower than the labour force
dictated by the free mobile labour context. As the population becomes larger
and larger, prots, capital income and labour income turn out to be larger in
the integrated economy, leading to an overall gain. Finally, looking at Figure 7,
the lower demand elasticity country seems to never be better o¤ in a segmented
economy.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We nd that as long as industry sectors or regions di¤ers only by labour sup-
ply, a labour segmented economy cannot perform better than a fully integrated
one, in which labour,as well as capital,is allowed to freely move sectors/regions.
However, if within sector mark-ups also di¤er, labour allocation is distorted
asymmetrically across sectors possibly leading to ine¢ ciency at the global level.
The latter is due to an overallocation of factors into the relatively more com-
petitive sectors/ regions with lower mark-ups.
In a trade context, as long as countries have the same degree of internal
competitiveness, labour market integration can lead to an e¢ ciency improve-
ment through a better allocation of labour according to relative productivities
of rms. Nevertheless, if countries, such as regions or industrial sectors, di¤er
by demand elasticity, then integration is likely to lead to an excess of labour
into the more competitive market.
This result can be relevant in order to understand di¢ culties that are cur-
rently faced by countries to get into the European Union, such as Turkey or
some Eastern Europe countries.
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